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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates the performance of leading micro-founded pricing-to-market frictions vis-a-vis
a set of robust stylized facts about international prices. In order to make that evaluation meaningful,
we embed each friction into a unified IRBC framework and parameterize the models in a uniform
way. Our goal is to evaluate the broad-based applicability of these frictions for policy-oriented
DSGE modeling by documenting their strengths and weaknesses. We make three points: (i) the
mechanisms generating pricing to market are not always neutral to business cycle dynamics of
quantities, (ii) some mechanisms require producer markups at least 50% to account for the full
range of estimates of the empirical exchange rate pass-through to export prices of 35%-50%, (iii)
some frictions crucially depend on a particular driver of uncertainty in the underlying model.
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1 Introduction
It is a well known fact that frictionless international macro models, while successful in ac-
counting for business cycle dynamics of quantities, fail to account for international prices. In
particular, they are inconsistent with a vast empirical literature documenting international
deviations from law of one price and incompleteness of exchange rate pass-through. Not
surprisingly, reconciling the predictions of business cycle models for international prices with
to the data has been on the forefront of research in international economics.
Thus far, the literature has identified two promising directions to remedy the problems
with prices: (i) sticky prices in local currency, and (ii) pricing-to-market (PTM hereafter).
In the first family of models, a friction of adjusting nominal prices in local currency directly
limits the adjustment of all prices, and thus naturally leads to deviations from the law of one
price across the border (LOP hereafter). In the second family, prices are flexible, but instead
real frictions result in deviations from LOP.
In many ways, the above two directions should be regarded as complementary. It is
a well established fact that sticky price models generate far too little persistence of the
deviations from the law of one price on the international level (without additional sources of
real rigidities)1. In addition, when volatile exchange rates are reproduced by these models,
they typically imply enormous gains from price adjustment across the border, raising the
questions about the size of the costs that could endogenously hinder nominal price adjustment.
Since micro-founded PTM models can, in principle, remedy both problems when incorporated
into a sticky price model, they thus seem a promising avenue from this perspective, but only
to the extent that these real frictions, without nominal rigidities, deliver desirable properties
for prices.
The literature has proposed several micro-founded frictions generating PTM. In various
contexts, these frictions have been demonstrated to be capable of improving upon their
respective frictionless benchmarks. However, since the definition of the frictionless benchmark
as well as the set of analyzed data moments typically vary across the contributions, at this
point it is hard to compare the performance of these mechanisms against each other, and
1Strategic complementarities can generate more persistent price stickiness and thus more persistent devi-
ations from the law of one price (still falling short of the persistence the data, as in Johri & Lahiri (2008)).
In addition, they are not a universal remedy, as they at the same time raise the level of predicted exchange
rate pass-through to export prices. Only a particular mix of local currency pricing and producer currency
pricing can deliver the empirical levels of pass-through to export prices.
thus evaluate their potential for policy-oriented work.
In an attempt to fill this gap, this paper performs a consistent comparison of several
leading frictions in the literature that can generate PTM. To this end, as a point of our
departure, we consider the same particular frictionless business cycle model that is relevant
from an applied perspective, and embed all the frictions into this common framework. We
then focus on the following three key features which, in our view, are likely to determine
the broad-based applicability of these frictions to policy-oriented business-cycle work: (i)
dependence of the mechanism generating PTM on a particular source of economic fluctuations
in the model, (ii) neutrality of the mechanism generating PTM for the dynamic behavior of
quantities, and finally, (iii) the degree of deviations from the law of one price generated by
the friction.
Clearly, given the uncertainty about the actual shocks that drive the enormous exchange
rate volatility in the data, the first feature determines to what a extent a given friction can
be employed in DSGE models featuring different types of shocks. The second feature is
important because accounting for dynamics of prices should not be achieved by sacrificing
the quantitative fit of the model in other dimensions. Finally, the third feature determines
how well a given friction accomplishes its primary goal of bringing prices closer to the data.
Our formal analysis focuses on the following four state-of-the-art PTM mechanisms widely
cited in the literature.
1. Industry aggregation friction first introduced by Dornbush (1987), and further developed
into a quantitative trade/macro model by Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
2. Consumer search friction developed by Alessandria (2009).
3. Deep habits, developed by Ravn Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), and extended in other
papers by the same authors.
4. Costly distribution friction, proposed by Corsetti and Dedola (2005)2
All selected frictions are potentially amenable to quantitative analysis within large-scale
DSGE models, and all are micro-founded3. Nevertheless, while guided by these criteria,
our selection remains fairly arbitrary and incomplete.
2Or by the related work by the same authors that circulated since 2002 as an ECB working paper.
3Arise from a meaningful micro-level friction and thus allow for an enhanced quantitative discipline using
micro-level evidence
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The nature of our exercise is as follows. We embed each friction into the standard business
cycle model a la Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1995), and parameterize each model using a
common set of data targets that are fairly standard in the literature. Whenever this is not
possible, our preferred approach is to use the methodology or parameters from the original
papers that introduced these frictions. To focus on the ability of each friction to generate
deviations from the law of one price, in our qualitative analysis we focus on the predicted
theoretical pass-through of exchange rates to export prices and contrast it with the available
evidence. In our quantitative analysis, we study a set of simple moments pertaining to export
prices deflated by the price of comparable domestic goods (basket of goods). These tests are
typically most challenging for the theories to account for. Moreover, in most models, this
approach additionally allows us to largely abstract from the exact mechanism generating real
exchange rate movements—which are often counterfactual. Finally, to evaluate each PTM
mechanism comprehensively, we also look at the predictions of the models for quantities and
assess the importance of the exact specification of the forcing process.
Even though we often refer to each friction by citing the paper that introduced it, it is
important to stress that our exercise modifies the models, and also takes a very selective look
at the implications of the theory. Thus, our results should not be interpreted as a criticism of
these original contributions. The exercise we perform here is intended to inform researchers
about the differences between these mechanisms when modeled within a particular unified
environment. From this perspective this is an imperfect exercise, but to our knowledge we
are the first to perform it. We certainly do not claim that the frictions considered here
would not perform differently in a different environment. We think of this paper as a first
step toward popularizing the use of these frictions and helping to make informed modeling
choices that suit best the intended applications. Clearly, by the very nature of our exercise,
we devote here relatively more attention to uncover the weaknesses rather strengths of these
theories. This, however, should not obscure the fact that all frictions we cite have been
developed to work well within different environments, and within these environments have
been shown successful4. Moreover, we focus here solely on the quantitative comparison of
aggregate implications of the models, and do not discuss the micro-level evidence behind each
4In particular, Ravn et al. (2006) model has been developed to primarily deal with government shocks
generating habit and develop counter-cyclical markups; Atkeson and Burstein (2008) is a trade model that
was intended to bridge the gap between micro model and trade models with IO features and firm level
heterogeneity; the original model features firm level heterogeneity and fixed cost of entry that we ignore here.
3
proposed PTM mechanism (which is clearly an important issue).
We make three points:
(1) Not all frictions generating PTM are neutral to business cycle dynamics
of quantities. Moreover, some of the counterfactual implications are directly
implied by the very mechanism generating PTM. First, the costly distribution and
deep habits frictions are fully neutral to the predictions for quantities. The remaining two:
industry aggregation friction due to Atkeson & Burstein (2008) and consumer search friction
due to Alessandria (2009) significantly affect the fit of the model for quantities.
First, the industry aggregation friction was designed to work in a low-frequency-oriented
trade model, as the PTM mechanism there requires a high elasticity between home and
imported goods (consistent with the trade literature). However, the required high elasticity,
while being useful to think about lower frequency deviations from the law of one price and
incompleteness of pass-through, on higher frequencies hurts the implications of the model
for quantities. In particular, the high elasticity resurrects some of the problems of the early
Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1992) setup with one homogeneous good, like excess comovement
of TFP over output or excess comovement of consumption over output. Furthermore, the
industry aggregation frictions delivers PTM through movements of importer’s market shares
that affect elasticity of demand. Consequently, in order to deliver deviations from LOP that
are in line with the data, the model requires that the aggregate import shares be volatile.
Our back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that, for a plausible range of parameter values,
they are more volatile in the model than in the data5.
Second, the consumer search friction alters predictions for quantities when modeled as in
Alessandria (2009) (we denote this formulation as consumer search∗). This original specifica-
tion, featuring a linear utility function in labor with an exogenous labor-wedge shock, results
in excess volatility of employment and output. With CRRA utility and only productivity
shocks, similar problems arise6. We fix these problems in our baseline specification of the
friction by modifying the original model and making search a market activity. This restores a
good fit for quantities, while still delivering statistics for prices, but also alters the economic
interpretation of the friction.
5This is less of a problem on lower frequencies—as suggested by much higher estimates of long-run price
elasticities of trade.
6Employment is negatively correlated internationally, and there too little comovement of output.
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(2) The equilibrium level of markups significantly affects the performance of
the models for pricing. All frictions except for the case of industry aggregation friction
require high equilibrium markups in order to reproduce a sufficiently high pass-through co-
efficient of exchange rates to export prices. In our benchmark comparison, we set markups
equal to 30%, which turns out to be insufficient. In particular, the consumer search friction,
and especially costly distribution, friction7 deliver a subset of moments for prices at our tar-
geted level of 30% markups, but in order to be consistent with the full range of empirical
estimates of 35-50% of exchange rate pass-through to export prices, they require markups
of at least 50%. The industry aggregation friction does well for the benchmark setting of
markups, but quantity statistics deteriorate rapidly when markups are lowered significantly
below this level (while still matching statistics on prices). In particular, when markups are
set to 15%, as suggested by Basu & Fernald (1997), the country’s import shares need to be
much more volatile in the model to deliver PTM.
What is the appropriate target for markups? There is a lot of conflicting evidence about
the level of markups in manufacturing. Industry studies point to numbers around 20-30%
(as used by Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Alessandria (2009)) or sometimes even higher,
while on the other end, there are aggregate estimates by Basu & Fernald (1997) pointing to
markups as low as 10-15%.
(3) Not all models are independent from the specifics of the forcing process.
We find that the deep habits model with productivity shocks or standard demand shocks
delivers deviations from LOP in the opposite direction to the desired one (export markups fall
relative to home markups when the real exchange rate depreciates, and theoretical exchange
rate pass-through to export prices is negative). This makes the model perform worse vis-
a-vis our frictionless benchmark. It should be noted, however, that when demand shocks
are modeled as stochastic government purchases that are additionally subject to deep habit
formation, they can give rise to PTM in the right direction—as demonstrated by Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2007).8 We do not consider shocks of this kind here.
7In costly distribution friction only part of the markup is in the foreign unit, whereas in consumer search
model the whole markup is. Thus, it is easier to get more PTM in consumer search model than in costly
distribution model for the same level of markups.
8For such shocks, the model implies that following a government spending shock, the real exchange rate
appreciates, rather than depreciates as in the standard models. According to some VAR-evidence, such
correlation of the real exchange rate may be consistent with the data for some countries, including US and
Japan (see Corsetti, Dedola & Leduc (2006)).
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Last but not least, each friction delivers some additional desirable properties that we
do not discuss, but which should be pointed out to complete our description. For instance,
industry aggregation friction in the Atkeson and Burstein (2008) formulation is a parsimonious
low frequency-oriented model with IO features that nicely fits into the modern trade theory.
Alessandria (2009) not only delivers pricing to market, but also links international deviations
from the law of one price to price dispersion of physically identical goods more broadly.
Corsetti & Dedola (2005) show in a tractable and intuitive framework how the existence
of a simple distribution cost on the retail level in a vertically integrated industry can lead
to a time-varying elasticity of demand on the producer level and consequently change the
dynamics of producer-level prices (wholesale prices). Finally, the deep habits model by Ravn
et al. (2006) gives a convincing explanation of counter-cyclical markups over the business
cycle.
2 Theory
In the next five sections, we set up the the models for later quantitative comparison. We
start off by setting up the bare-bone framework into which we will later incorporate all the
frictions—the Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1995) model. Then, we move on to the modeling
details of each particular friction considered by us.
2.1 Basic Frictionless Model
The overall structure of the model follows Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1995). Time is discrete,
t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞, and there are two ex-ante symmetric countries labeled domestic and foreign.
Each country is populated by identical and infinitely lived households which supply labor
and physical capital, consume goods, trade assets, and accumulate physical capital. Tradable
intermediate goods are country-specific: d is produced in the domestic country, and f in
the foreign country. The only source of uncertainty in the economy are country-specific
productivity shocks.
Goods are traded at two levels: intermediate and final. At the intermediate good level,
producers of goods (d at home and f abroad) sell their respective good to final good producers
from each country. International trade happens only at the intermediate level. On the final
good level, local final good producers combine d and f into a final consumption/investment
good and resell them to the local households in a perfectly competitive market.
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In terms of notation, we distinguish foreign country-related variables from the domestic
ones using an asterisk. The history of shocks up to and including period t is denoted by
st = (s0, s1, ..., st), where the initial realization s0, as well as the time invariant probability
measure µ over the compact shock space S are assumed given. In the presentation of the
model, whenever possible, we exploit symmetry of the two countries and present the model
from the domestic country’s perspective only.
2.1.1 Uncertainty and Production
Each country is assumed to have access to a constant returns to scale production function
zF (k, l) that uses country-specific capital k and labor l, and is subject to a country-specific
stochastic technology zˆ ≡ log(z) following an exogenous AR(1) process
zˆ(st) = ψzˆ(st−1) + εt, zˆ∗(st) = ψzˆ∗(st−1) + ε∗t , (1)
where 0 < ψ < 1 is a common persistence parameter, and st ≡ (εt, ε∗t ) ∈ S is an i.i.d.
normally distributed random variable with zero mean.
Since the production function is assumed to be constant returns to scale, we summarize
the production process by an economy-wide marginal cost v. Given domestic factor prices w,
r and domestic shock z, the marginal cost, equal to per unit cost, is given by:
v
(
st
) ≡ min
k,l
{
w
(
st
)
l + r
(
st
)
k subject to z
(
st
)
F (k, l) = 1
}
. (2)
2.1.2 Households
Each country is populated by a unit measure of identical and infinitely lived households.
Households supply production factors to domestic producers, accumulate physical capital,
and consume goods. After each history st, the stand-in household chooses the allocation,
which consists of the level of consumption c, investment in physical capital i, labor supply
l, and purchases of a set of one-period st+1-contingent bonds b (st+1|st) to maximize the
expected discounted lifetime utility
∞∑
t=0
βt
∫
St
u
(
c
(
st
)
, l
(
st
))
µ
(
dst
)
. (3)
Asset markets are complete, and the budget constraint of the domestic household is given
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by
P
(
st
) (
c
(
st
)
+ i
(
st
))
+
∫
S
Q(st+1|st)b(st+1|st)µ(dst+1) (4)
= b(st) + w
(
st
)
l
(
st
)
+ r
(
st
)
k
(
st−1
)
+ Π
(
st
)
,
k (t+ 1) = (1− δ) k (st)+ i (st) all st. (5)
In the above budget constraints, we assume that the composite consumption good in each
country is the numeraire. We do so by normalizing the level of prices P (st) in each country
to one so that the resulting ideal CPI price indexes in each country are equal to unity.9
The expenditure side of the budget constraint (4) consist of purchases of the consumption
and investment goods and purchases of one-period-forward st+1-state contingent bonds. The
income side consists of income from maturing bonds purchased at history st−1, labor income,
rental income from physical capital, and the dividends paid out by local firms. The foreign
budget constraint, due to a different numeraire unit, additionally involves a price x(st) that
translates the foreign numeraire to the domestic numeraire in the bond purchases term. By
definition of the numeraire in each country, this price is the real exchange rate10, which
integrates the domestic and foreign asset markets into one world asset market.11
Summarizing, given the initial values for k(s−1) and b(s−1) = 0, households choose their
allocations to maximize (3) subject to the budget constraint (4), the law of motion for physical
capital (5), the standard no—Ponzi scheme condition, and the numeraire normalization. The
first order conditions coming out of the household’s problem are
9The ideal-CPI is defined by the lowest cost of acquiring a unit of composite consumption (c in the domestic
country, c∗ in the foreign country)
10In the data real exchange rate is measured using fixed-weight CPI rather than ideal CPI indices. Quan-
titatively, this distinction turns out not to matter in this particular class of models.
11Since the foreign budget constraint is expressed in the foreign country numeraire, and so is b∗, in order
to use Q as the intertemporal price, the term x(st+1)b∗(st+1|st) first translates the purchase value of the
foreign bonds to the domestic country numeraire units, and then Q(st+1|st)/x(st) expresses the price of this
purchase again in terms of the foreign numeraire.
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Q
(
st+1|st) = βµ (st+1)
µ (st+1)
uc (s
t+1)
uc (st)
, (6)
x (st+1)
x (st)
Q
(
st+1|st
)
= β
µ (st+1)
µ (st+1)
u∗c (s
t+1)
u∗c (st)
x
(
st+1
)
= x
(
s0
) u∗c (st)
uc (st)
,
ul (s
t)
uc (st)
= −w (st) ,
uc
(
st
)
= Estβuc
(
st+1
) [
(1− δ) + r (st+1)] .
where ul (s
t) , uc (s
t) denote derivatives of the instantaneous utility function with respect to
the subscript arguments.
Iterating backward up to state s0 on (6) for the domestic and foreign country, we can
derive under ex-ante symmetry between countries the real exchange rate,
x
(
st
)
=
u∗c (s
t)
uc (st)
. (7)
The condition says that households fully share risk internationally, and equalize MRS from
consumption across the borders with the relative price of their consumption x.
2.1.3 Final Good Producers
In each country, there is a unit measure of final good producers, which buy goods d and
f from intermediate good producers in each country, and then aggregate them into the
final consumption/investment good. Intermediate goods are aggregated according to a CES
function given by
G(d, f) =
(
ωd
γ−1
γ + (1− ω) f γ−1γ
) γ
γ−1
, (8)
where γ is the elasticity of substitution (Armington elasticity) and ω is parameterizing home
bias.
Given the aggregation technology above, instantaneous profits of an aggregation firm are
P
(
st
)
G (d, f)− Pd
(
st
)
d
(
st
)− Pf (st) f (st) .
The market for producing the final good is perfectly competitive, and hence the optimality
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conditions for the final good producers’ problem are given by
Pd
(
st
)
= Gd
(
st
)
P
(
st
)
,
Pf
(
st
)
= Gf
(
st
)
P
(
st
)
,
and the aggregation constraint (8).
2.1.4 Intermediate Good Producers
Tradable intermediate goods, d, and f , are country-specific and are produced by a unit
measure of atomless competitive producers residing in each country. Producers employ local
capital and labor to produce these goods using the technology specific to their country of
residence. Their unit production costs are given by (2).
The instantaneous profit function Π of the producer is determined by the profits from
sales in each market and is given by
Π
(
st
)
=
(
pd
(
st
)− v (st)) d (st)+ (x (st) p∗d (st)− v (st)) d∗ (st) ∀st.
By the perfectly competitive nature of the market for intermediate goods, the equilibrium
conditions for the intermediate goods producers imply a zero profit restriction on prices (no
markup and law of one price):
pd
(
st
)
= x
(
st
)
p∗d
(
st
)
= v
(
st
)
.
2.1.5 Feasibility and Market Clearing
Equilibrium must satisfy the market clearing condition for bonds and the final good,
b
(
st
)
+ x∗
(
st
)
b∗
(
st
)
= 0
c
(
st
)
+ i
(
st
)
= G(d, f) ∀st,
and the aggregate resource constraint given by
d
(
st
)
+ d∗
(
st
)
= z
(
st
)
F
(
k
(
st−1
)
, l
(
st
)) ∀st.
The definition of equilibrium is straightforward and will be omitted.
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3 The Frictions
We now introduce the key frictions into the above base model that will give rise to pricing to
market. Below, we only discuss the differences between the particular setup at hand and the
base model’s setup just described. For each model, we also briefly analyze the driving forces
behind pricing to market.
3.1 Consumer Search
Here, we introduce into the frictionless setup the consumer search friction along the lines
of Alessandria (2009). However, compared to the original paper, we crucially modify the
setup so that the search occurs on the final good producer’s level rather than being done by
households. Such search is most naturally interpreted as business-to-business search friction,
and looses the direct connection to consumer search of the original setup. We do so to
improve the performance of the model on the quantity side without sacrificing prices, and
offer an alternative application of the friction. Later we also consider a version of this model
that adheres to the original more closely.
The production function and the household’s problem are identical to the one in the
frictionless benchmark and hence will be omitted (instead, Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 apply).
3.1.1 Final Good Producers
The final good producer aggregates good d and f to produce the final goods using a standard
CES aggregator, with elasticity of substitution γ:
G (d, f) =
(
ωd
γ−1
γ + (1− ω) f γ−1γ
) γ
γ−1
.
Goods d and f are assumed to be acquired by the the process of search by atomless represen-
tatives of the final good firm—employed at the economy-wide marginal cost v. Specifically, it
is assumed that in every period, the firm sends out measures sd and sf of its representatives
to purchase 1/θ units of good d and f , respectively. The total cost of this activity is given
by (sd + sf )v(s
t).
Each atomless representative observes one price quote of the commodity with probability
q and two simultaneous price quotes with probability 1 − q12. After observing the prices,
12The firms making the price quotes do not know what other prices the representative observes
11
she can purchase 1/θ of the particular commodity, d or f , from one of the quoting firms (in
the case of two quotes). Representatives are instructed by the headquarters to purchase the
goods at the lowest price possible—conditional that such price does not exceed the reservation
prices rd(s
t) and rf (s
t) set a priori by the headquarters. Since in equilibrium no posted price
will ever exceed these reservation prices, without loss of generality we can assume that the
representatives always make a purchase (i.e. all posted prices are lower than the reservation
prices). Given measures of searching representatives, the total amount of goods purchased
by the firm is thus given by:
d(st) =
sd(s
t)
θ
,
f(st) =
sf (s
t)
θ
.
The distribution of prices at which goods are purchased depends on the distribution of prices
posted by firms F (p; st), and is given by (the lowest of two draws from F ):
Hd(p; s
t) = qFd(p; s
t) + (1− q) [1− Fd(p; st)] ,
The average price actually paid by the representatives searching for commodity d can be
obtained by integrating over H13
pd(s
t) =
∫ Ph
Pl
p
dHd(p; s
t)
dp
dp,
where the bounds of the integration will be defined later.
3.1.2 Intermediate Good Producers
Intermediate good producers produce goods d and f that are purchased by the representatives
of the final good producers from the home country and the foreign country. The production
cost is equal to the marginal cost v.
The intermediate good producer, when making the price offer to any representative, does
not know what prices and how many this representative has observed. This feature, as first
demonstrated by Burdett & Judd (1982), is sufficient to give rise to a unique equilibrium
13The average price for f is straightforward by analogy.
12
featuring an endogenous price dispersion of physically identical goods. Burdett & Judd
(1982) show that the support of the prices posted by all firms selling in a given market is
compact and connected, and thus can be represented by a closed interval [Ph, Pl]. Moreover,
the optimal probability distribution F (·) is uniquely pinned down by the condition that, given
other producers draw from F (·), the intermediate good producer is indifferent between all
prices from the support of F (·). Formally, for any p ∈ [Pl(st), Ph(st)], the condition requires
that the probability F (p; st) that a posted price is lower than p satisfies:
(p− v(st))(q + 2(1− q)(1− F (p; st))) = (Ph(st)− v(st))q. (9)
This condition says that the expected profits from posting price p, factoring in the en-
dogenous probability of making a sale, (q+ 2(1− q)(1−F (p; st))), implied by the strategy F
played by others, must be the same as the profits from posting the highest price Ph. At this
highest price, by definition, the intermediate producer makes a sale if the representative has
only one price quote (which happens with probability q).
Clearly, for given bounds, Ph, Pl,, equation (9) defines the function F . These bounds
can be found as follows. The upper bound of the distribution Ph is determined by the
condition that the final good producer must be indifferent between buying the good for Ph
and instructing representatives who have a draw Ph(s
t) to abort the purchase and instead
send more searchers to purchase the good at the average price pd, i.e.
θv(st) = Ph(s
t)− pd(st).
The lowest bound can be found by plugging in Pl for p in (9).
The full characterization of equilibrium prices is thus given by
Ph(s
t) = v(st) +
θ
1− qv(s
t),
Pl(s
t) =
Ph(s
t)q + 2(1− q)v(st)
2− q = v(s
t) +
qθ
2− 3q + q2v(s
t),
F (p) = 1− 1
2
q
1− q
Ph(s
t)− p
p− v(st) ,
13
and the expected price paid by a representative looking for good d is given by
pd(s
t) = v(st) +
θq
1− θv(s
t)
3.1.3 Feasibility
Each economy produces a different type of good sold at home and abroad. The feasibility
implies:
d
(
st
)
+ d∗
(
st
)
+ θ(d
(
st
)
+ f
(
st
)
) = z
(
st
)
k
(
st
)α
n
(
st
)1−α
f
(
st
)
+ f ∗
(
st
)
+ θ(f ∗
(
st
)
+ d∗
(
st
)
) = z∗
(
st
)
k∗
(
st
)α
n∗
(
st
)(1−α)
Assets must be in zero net supply, and so
b(st) + x(st)b∗(st) = 0,
Finally, the final good market must clear:
c
(
st
)
+ i
(
st
)
=
(
ωd
(
st
) γ−1
γ + (1− ω) f (st) γ−1γ ) γγ−1 ∀st.
3.2 Consumer Search*
This is an extension of the baseline model that is very close to the original one from the
published paper. In this version, following Alessandria (2009), we introduce search into the
household’s problem, and hence there are no final good producers in this formulation. The
intermediate good producers’ problem is identical to the one above. Below, we discuss the
differences between the household’s problem in the frictionless model and this specification
below.
3.2.1 Households
The search friction requires that households need to search in order to purchase goods d and
f. Specifically, it is assumed that the household can send measures nd and nf of searchers
who can purchase z¯ units of good d and f , respectively. These measures are counted against
the total time endowment of the household.
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Each searcher sent by the household observes one price of the good with probability q
and two prices with probability 1− q. Searchers are instructed to purchase the goods at the
lowest price, conditional on not exceeding the reservation prices rd(s
t) and rf (s
t) set by the
household. Since in equilibrium no posted price will ever exceed these reservation prices, we
can assume for simplicity that the searchers always make a purchase (i.e. all posted prices
are lower than the reservation prices).
The total amount of goods purchased by the searchers is given by:
d(st) = nd(s
t)z¯,
f(st) = nf (s
t)z¯.
where z¯ is the number of units purchased by each searcher.
Since each searcher purchases at the lowest price possible, the distribution of transacted
prices is different from the distribution of posted prices by firms F (·), and is given by (the
lowest of two draws from F):
Hd(p; s
t) = qFd(p; s
t) + (1− q) [1− Fd(p; st)] ,
The average price actually paid by the searchers (thus the household) is given by
pd(s
t) =
∫ Ph
Pl
p
dHd(p; s
t)
dp
dp,
where the function G and the bounds of the integration are defined as in Section 3.1.2.
Because search counts against time endowment of the household, the total amount of
labor entering the utility function is given by
l(st) = n
(
st
)
+ θ(d
(
st
)
/z¯ − f (st) /z¯),
where n is the time devoted to work in production of goods, θ is disutility from shopping,
and z¯ is defined as before.
Following the original paper, we also use a linear utility in labor
u(c, l) =
c1−σ
1− σ − κl,
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and introduce shocks to κ (labor-wedge shock). The shock is backed out from the data on real
wages and consumption, and labor-leisure choice first order condition implied the household’s
problem:
κ =
wt
Pt
c−σ.
Business cycle volatility of this object is about 4.5%, and it allows the model to match closely
the volatility of the real exchange rate (for the US). In this version of the setup, we also assume
a convex cost of capital adjustment, parameterized by φ, which gives rise to a new capital
accumulation equation given by
k (t+ 1) = (1− δ) k (st)+ i (st)− φk(st)( i(st)
k(st)
− δ
)2
all st.
The calibration of the model crucially differs from the baseline specification, as here shop-
ping time is counted as home rather than market production. This imposed an additional
restriction on the parameter values that search time is about 25% of work time, as implied
by the time use survey of households. Since a lot of search is on B2B level, in our view, it is
not the case that any of the two specifications is clearly superior independent of the context.
3.3 Costly Distribution
In this section, we modify the frictionless model to introduce monopolistic competition on
the intermediate good level and a distribution-cost friction as in Corsetti & Dedola (2005).
The friction here is that each producer is a monopolist over a country-specific variety of good,
and for each good, a local distribution cost has to be incurred in order to deliver it to the
final consumer. The existence of the distribution cost in this setup makes the demand for
each variety of good depend not only on the price of that good charged by intermediate good
producers, but also on the local cost of distribution, in effect delivering what is perceived by
intermediate good producers as time-varying price elasticity of demand due to variation in
the size of the distribution cost.
We first setup the baseline version of the model, and then extend it to introduce an explicit
non-tradable sector as in the original formulation. The production function for each variety of
good and the household’s problem are identical to the one in the frictionless benchmark and
hence will be omitted (instead, Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 apply). For simplicity of exposition,
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we introduce three levels of production. First, at the lowest level of aggregation, imperfectly
competitive intermediate good producers in each country produce a continuum of varieties
of their respective goods (d (i) and f (i)) and then sell their goods to sectoral good producers,
who pay a fixed distribution cost per unit, aggregate them, and resell the country specific
composite goods to the final good producers. The final good producers aggregate the domestic
and foreign composite goods into a final consumption/investment good. Their problem is
identical to the frictionless model and is described in Section 2.1.3. The problems of sectoral
good producer and intermediate good producer are described below.
3.3.1 Sectoral Good Producers
The sectoral good producers aggregate a variety of differentiated intermediate goods pur-
chased from measure one of intermediate good producers from each country. In addition
to paying the purchase price for the good to the intermediate good producer, each sectoral
producer has to pay a distribution cost denominated in local output14. In particular, in order
to sell a good in the domestic market, each sectoral producer has to pay a distribution cost
ξ denominated in units of the domestic output, and therefore having price equal to marginal
cost v (st). They aggregate different varieties of goods into composite goods d and f accord-
ing to a CES production function with elasticity of substitution between varieties equal to
θ:
d
(
st
)
= (
∫ 1
0
d(i, st)
θ−1
θ di)
θ
θ−1 ,
f
(
st
)
= (
∫ 1
0
f(i, st)
θ−1
θ di)
θ
θ−1 .
The instantaneous profit function of the sectoral producers is given by
Pd
(
st
)
d
(
st
)
+Pf
(
st
)
f
(
st
)−∫ 1
0
[
pd
(
i, st
)
+ ξv
(
st
)]
d(i, st)di−
∫ 1
0
[
pf
(
i, st
)
+ ξv
(
st
)]
f(i, st)di.
14We can think of the sectoral good producers as just employing capital and labor to produce distribution
services according to the economy-wide technology.
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Markets for composite goods are competitive, and hence the prices of composite goods charged
by sectoral good producers are given by
Pd(s
t) =
[∫ 1
0
(
pd(i, s
t) + ξv
(
st
))1−θ
di
] 1
1−θ
,
for composite good d and
Pf (s
t) =
[∫ 1
0
(
pf (i, s
t) + ξv
(
st
))1−θ
di
] 1
1−θ
,
for composite good f .
Demand functions for goods d(i) and f(i) are given by
d(i, st) =
(
pd(i, s
t) + ξv (st)
Pd(st)
)−θ
d(st),
f(i, st) =
(
pf (i, s
t) + ξv (st)
Pf (st)
)−θ
f(st).
The above equations capture the key implication of the introduced friction. Unlike in
the frictionless Dixit-Stiglitz model, here demand for each variety of good depends not only
on the price charged by each intermediate good producer (pd (i, s
t) and pf (i, s
t)), but also
on the local marginal distribution cost. Hence, intermediate good producers will perceive
a time-varying price elasticity of demand for their goods and thus price-to-market in which
they sell.
3.3.2 Intermediate Good Producers
In each country, there is measure one of imperfectly competitive intermediate good producers,
indexed by i. Their unit production costs are given by (2).
A producer of variety i ∈ [0, 1] chooses home wholesale price pd(i, st) and dock export
price p∗d(i, s
t) to maximize profit
[
pd(i, s
t)− v (st)] d(i, st) + [x(st)p∗d(i, st)− v (st)] d∗(i, st)
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subject to demand equations coming from the sectoral level
d(i, st) =
(
pd(i, s
t) + ξv(st)
Pd(st)
)−θ
d(st),
d∗(i, st) =
(
p∗d(i, s
t) + ξv∗(st)
P ∗d (st)
)−θ
d∗(st).
The wholesale prices that are the solution to the above problem are
pd(i, s
t) =
θ
θ − 1v(s
t) +
ξ
θ − 1v(s
t), (10)
px(s
t) ≡ x(st)p∗d(i, st) =
θ
θ − 1v(s
t) +
ξ
θ − 1x(s
t)v∗(st).
3.3.3 Feasibility
Equilibrium requires several market clearing conditions and feasibility constraints. Represen-
tativeness of intermediate goods producers implies
d(i, st) = d(st)
d∗(i, st) = d∗(st)
f(i, st) = f(st)
f ∗(i, st) = f ∗(st)
Resource feasibility with distribution cost implies
d
(
st
)
+ d∗
(
st
)
+ ξ(d(st) + f(st)) = zk
(
st
)α
n
(
st
)1−α
f
(
st
)
+ f ∗
(
st
)
+ ξ(d∗(st) + f ∗(st)) = z∗k∗
(
st
)α
n∗
(
st
)(1−α)
Zero net supply of assets implies
b(st) + x(st)b∗(st) = 0.
The other feasibility conditions are embedded into notation.
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3.4 Costly Distribution*
Here, we extend the baseline friction outlined above to incorporate non-tradable goods. This
specification includes an explicit distinction between tradable and non-tradable sector and is
set up and parameterized very closely to the original paper. Just like in the original model,
we assume a symmetric Cobb-Douglas aggregator of tradable goods d and f and non-tradable
goods. Specifically, the aggregation constraints in the household problem become
c
(
st
)
+ i
(
st
)
= 2
(
cT
) 1
2
(
cN
) 1
2 ,
cT (d, f) = 2d(st)
1
2f(st)
1
2 .
Just like the baseline friction, this version of the model also features monopolistic compe-
tition in production of a variety of non-tradable goods. The distribution cost in this version of
the model is incurred in units of the non-tradable good. Specifically, sectoral good producers
need to purchase ξ units of a local non-tradable good from the monopolistically competitive
producers. There is no distribution cost of non-tradable goods.
The pricing formulas are very similar, but now involve an explicit distinction between
tradable and non-tradable goods:
pd(i, s
t) =
θ
θ − 1v
T (st) +
ξ
θ − 1P
N(st),
px(i, s
t) ≡ x(st)p∗d(i, st) =
θ
θ − 1v
T (st) +
ξ
θ − 1x(s
t)PN∗(st).
The specification of the forcing process is sector specific, and so the baseline period of the
later quantitative specification of this model is 1 year.
3.5 Deep Habits
In this section, we modify the base model with monopolistic competition on the intermediate
good level and ’relative deep habits’, as proposed by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2006).
The friction here is that each intermediate good producer is a monopolist over a country-
specific variety of good, and for each good, consumers develop exogenous habits, i.e. the
evolution of habits is driven by average purchases of each variety and not purchases of any
individual household. For simplicity of exposition, we will actually model habits as being
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formed at the level of the producers, which is homomorphic to the setup in which it is
directly incorporated into the consumer problem.
The production function for each variety of good and the household’s problem are identical
to the one in the frictionless benchmark and hence will be omitted (instead, Sections 2.1.1
and 2.1.2 apply). For simplicity of exposition, as in the case of the costly distribution, here
we introduce three levels of production. First, at the lowest level of aggregation, imperfectly
competitive intermediate good producers in each country produce a continuum of varieties of
their respective goods (d (i) and f (i)) and then sell their goods to sectoral good producers, who
aggregate d (i) s and f (i) s into composite domestic and imported goods d and f , respectively,
and then resell them to the final good producers. For clarity of exposition, we assume that
habits here are formed at the level of the sectoral good producers. This assumption is
equivalent to habit formation on the household level as assumed by the original paper15 (first
order conditions are the same). Final good producers aggregate the composite goods into
a final consumption/investment good. Their problem is identical to the frictionless model’s
and is described in Section 2.1.3. The sectoral and intermediate good producers’ problems
are described below.
3.5.1 Sectoral Good Producers
Sectoral good producers are perfectly competitive and produce the composite goods d and
f by aggregating varieties of habit-adjusted quantities dh(j) and fh(j) according to a CES
aggregator with elasticity ϕ :
d(st) =
[∫ 1
0
dh
(
j, st
)ϕ−1
ϕ dj
] ϕ
ϕ−1
,
f(st) =
[∫ 1
0
fh
(
j, st
)ϕ−1
ϕ dj
] ϕ
ϕ−1
.
For each good j ∈ [0, 1], the habit-corrected quantity dh (j) is assumed to be determined by
the level of habit from yesterday, h (j, st−1), and the purchases of the good today, D (j, st),
according to the formula
dh
(
j, st
)
=
D (j, st)
hd (j, st−1)
θ
,
15This greatly simplifies the exposition as the household problem stays the same.
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where θ parameterizes the strength of the habit (θ assumed to be less than zero, following the
convention introduced by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2006)). Habit is formed according
to the following law of motion:
hd
(
j, st
)
= ρhd
(
j, st−1
)
+ (1− ρ) d¯c (j, st)
where d¯c is the average level of purchases of good j in the economy—introduced here so that
the households do not internalize the effect of their purchases on their own level of habit
(catching up with the Joneses specification of habit). Analogous equations hold for good f .
The instantaneous profit function of the sectoral producers is given by the expression
Pd
(
st
)
d
(
st
)
+ Pf
(
st
)
f
(
st
)− ∫ 1
0
pd
(
i, st
)
d(i, st)di−
∫ 1
0
pf
(
i, st
)
f(i, st)di,
where pd (i, s
t) and pf (i, s
t) are prices charged by the monopolistically competitive interme-
diate good producers.
The sectoral good producer’s problem can be simplified by solving a temporal decision
of allocating purchases across the j goods. For any amount of the aggregate goods desired,
d and f , given prices, pd (j) and pf (j), it is straightforward to show that there is a unique
expenditure-minimizing allocation of D (j) and F (j), given by
D
(
i, st
)
=
(
pd (i, s
t)
Pd (st)
)−ϕ
hd
(
i, st−1
)θ(1−ϕ)
d, (11)
F
(
i, st
)
=
(
pf (i, s
t)
Pf (st)
)−ϕ
hf
(
i, st−1
)θ(1−ϕ)
f, (12)
where the aggregate price indices are defined as
Pf
(
st
) ≡ [∫ hf (j, st−1)θ(1−ϕ) pf (j, st)1−ϕ dj] 11−ϕ ,
Pd
(
st
) ≡ [∫ hd (j, st−1)θ(1−ϕ) pd (j, st)1−ϕ dj] 11−ϕ .
This allows us to express the final good producer’s problem16 in a standard way as in Section
16To save on notation, the setup here is a simplified version of the setup that we use in the quantitative
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2.1.3.
3.5.2 Intermediate Good Producers
In each country, there is measure one of imperfectly competitive intermediate good producers,
indexed by i. Their unit production costs are given by (2) and are the same across varieties
within a country. Producers take the demand relations (11)-(12) as given, as well as the
prices charged by other producers. They are monopolists for their own variety of good j,
and so they internalize the effect of their sales on the habit formation for their own good.
Specifically, they take into account the laws of motion for habit
hd
(
j, st
)
= hd
(
j, st−1
)
ρ+ (1− ρ)D (j, st) ,
h∗d
(
j, st
)
= h∗d
(
j, st−1
)
ρ+ (1− ρ)D∗ (j, st)
into their optimization problem. The instantaneous profit function of a domestic producer is
(
pd
(
j, st
)− v (st)) d (j, st)+ (x (st) p∗d (j, st)− v (st)) d∗ (j, st) .
The optimization problem of each intermediate good producer is to maximize the the
present discounted stream of instantaneous profits, where the discount factor is implied by
the consumer’s stochastic discount factor, subject to demand equations and laws of motion for
habit. The problem is inherently dynamic as the habit h is a state variable from the producer’s
perspective. We omit the formal definition of this problem as it is straightforward.
analysis section. There, we exclude investment i from the habit formation process, as it seemed more natural
for us to think of investment as being denominated in physical units rather than habit adjusted units. Habit
is only imposed on consumption goods. We have verified that this distinction would not make any significant
difference for any of the result reported throughout the paper.
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3.5.3 Feasibility
The following feasibility conditions have to hold in equilibrium at every st and for all j:
D
(
j, st
)
+D∗
(
j, st
)
= zk
(
j, st
)α
l
(
j, st
)1−α
,
F
(
j, st
)
+ F ∗
(
j, st
)
= z∗k∗
(
j, st
)α
l∗
(
j, st
)(1−α)
,∫
k
(
i, st
)
di = k(st),∫
l
(
i, st
)
di = l(st),∫
k∗
(
i, st
)
di = k∗(st),∫
l∗
(
i, st
)
di = l∗(st),
Representativeness implies that for all i, j : d (j) = d (i) , f (j) = f (i) , k (j) = k (i) ,
l (j) = l (i) , hd (j) = hd (i) , hd (j) = hd (i) , hd (j) = hd (i) , hd (j) = hd (i) , hf (j) = hf (i).
As before, zero net supply of assets on the international level implies
b(st) + x(st)b∗(st) = 0.
3.6 Industry Aggregation
This section studies the friction developed by Atkeson and Burstein (2008). The key feature
introduced by this friction is a monopolistic competition featuring a nested two-layer CES
demand system. The price elasticity of demand perceived by firms is going to be an average
of the two elasticities at different layers of aggregation, with the weight depending on a firm’s
market share. Variation of market shares over the business cycle will translate into variation
in markups, and in particular, different variation in the home and foreign markets—driving
PTM in the model.
The production function for each variety of good and the household’s problem are identical
to the one in the frictionless benchmark and hence will be omitted (instead, Sections 2.1.1 and
2.1.2 apply). In contrast to the setup in the original paper, here we exogenously fix the number
of firms in the economy, and make them all identical. There are also no non-tradable goods.
Production in the economy is divided into sectors and individual goods and will feature three
levels of production. First, at the lowest level of aggregation, a finite number of imperfectly
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competitive (Cournot competitors) intermediate good producers in sector j in each country
produce a variety of their respective goods k (d (k, j) and f (k, j)) and then sell their goods to
sectoral good producers, who aggregate d (k, j) s and f (k, j) s into composite sectoral goods
y (j) and sell them to final good producers. Final good producers aggregate the composite
sectoral goods into a final consumption/investment good. The critical assumption of the
model is that the elasticity between sectoral goods y (j) is low relative to the elasticity within
sector at the intermediate good level. We describe formally all three levels of production/
aggregation below.
3.6.1 Final Good Producers
Final consumption c(st) and investment goods i(st) in home country are produced by a
competitive firm using the output of a continuum of identical sectors j, y(j, st) according to
the aggregation constraint
c(st) + i(st) =
[∫ 1
0
(
y(j, st)
)1− 1
γ dj
] γ
γ−1
. (13)
Given prices of each sectoral good, P (j, st), the inverse demand equation for y(j, st) is
P (j, st)
P (st)
=
(
y(j, st)
c(st) + i(st)
)−1
γ
,
where P (st) is the price index (lowest cost of acquiring a unit of the final investment/consumption
good), given by
P (st) =
(∫ 1
0
(
P (j, st)
)1−γ
dj
)1/(1−γ)
,
and is normalized to serve as the numeraire.
3.6.2 Sectoral Good Producers
There is a unit mass of perfectly competitive sectoral good producers in each sector in each
country. They purchase goods from intermediate good producers within the sector and ag-
gregate them into sectoral output. We assume that there are n home and nX intermediate
good producers operating within each sector j, with intermediate good producers indexed by
k.
The aggregation of individual goods into sectoral output good is guided by a CES aggre-
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gator with elasticity ρ:
y(j, st) =
[
n∑
k=1
(
d(k, j, st)
) ρ−1
ρ +
nX∑
k=n+1
(
f(k, j, st)
) ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
.
The instantaneous profit function of the sectoral producers is given by the expression
P
(
j, st
)
y
(
j, st
)− n∑
k=1
Pd
(
k, j, st
)
d(k, j, st)−
∫ 1
0
Pf
(
k, j, st
)
f(k, j, st),
and the inverse demand for a domestic intermediate good k in sector j is
Pd(k, j, s
t)
P (j, st)
=
(
d(k, j, st)
y(j, st)
)−1
ρ
,
where the sectoral price index P (j, st) is taken by them as given and it is defined by
P (j, st) =
[
n∑
k=1
(
Pd(k, s
t)
)1−ρ
+
nX∑
k=n+1
(
Pf (k, s
t)
)1−ρ] 11−ρ
.
Since the firm’s problem is effectively static, sectoral producers maximize the instantaneous
profit function given prices, and subject to the aggregation constraint. Note here that since
all firms of the same type and all sectors within each country are identical, the subscripts j
and k are redundant here once we restrict attention to type-identical allocations.
3.6.3 Intermediate Good Producers
We assume that there are n home and nX intermediate good producers operating within
each sector j, indexed by k. They employ local labor and capital to produce their respective
variety of good. Their unit production costs are given by (2) and are the same across varieties
within a country. They are Cournot competitors.
The problem of the domestic country producer k selling in sector j of the home market
is given by choosing price p and quantity d to maximize profit (at all st):
pid(j, s
t) =
(
p− v(st)) d
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subject to demand equation implied by sectoral and final good producer demands
p =
(
d
y(j, st)
)− 1
ρ
(
y(j, st)
c(st) + i(st)
)− 1
γ
.
The implicit solution to the maximization problem is given by
p =
ε(j, st)
ε(j, st)− 1v(s
t),
where the elasticity ε(j, st) is a function of the market share of intermediate good producer
k and involves the choices of all other producers (Cournot competition):
ε(j, st) =
[
1
ρ
(
1− S(j, st))+ 1
γ
S(j, st)
]−1
S(j, st) = pd
[
n∑
κ=1
Pd(κ, j, s
t)d(κ, j, st) +
nX∑
κ=1
Pf (κ, j, s
t)f(κ, j, st)
]−1
,
where Pd(k, j, s
t)d(k, j, st) = pd.
The maximization for other markets is defined in an analogous fashion, and can be con-
sidered separately due to constant returns to scale. The only modification is that to produce
for exports, a producer has to incur an exporting cost of τ units of own production per unit
exported.
3.6.4 Feasibility
Representativeness implies that subscripts k and j are redundant, and all variables indexed
by these subscripts must take the same value. Given this assumption, production feasibility
is given by
nd(st) + nXd
∗(st) (1 + τ) = z(st)k(st)αl(st)1−α,
nf ∗(st) + nXf ∗(st) (1 + τ) = z∗(st)k∗(st)αl∗(st)1−α,
As before, the bond market clearing is given by
b
(
st
)
+ x
(
st
)
b∗
(
st
)
= 0.
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4 Sources of PTM and Qualitative Analysis
4.1 Consumer Search
Formulas for prices depend here on the local search cost. Specifically, the export price of the
good in the model is given by
px(s
t) = v(st) +
θq
1− qx(s
t)v∗(st),
while the home price of the some good is given by
pd(s
t) = v(st) +
θq
1− qv(s
t).
Dividing these two prices, we note that the deviations from the law of one price generated
by the model can be directly linked to the cost-based real exchange rate x(st)v∗(st)/v(st):
pxd(s
t) ≡ px(s
t)
pd(st)
=
1 + θq
1−q
x(st)v∗(st)
v(st)
1 + θq
1−q
.
Moreover, the magnitude of pricing to market generated by the model crucially depends on
the level of producer markups θq
1−q . Below we discuss the quantitative implication of this
feature of the model for different levels of markups.
4.1.1 Quantitative Potential for PTM
As noted above, the model can generate pricing to market and incomplete pass-through of
exchange rates due to costly search denominated in local units. Here we asses how large these
effects will be by deriving the theoretical pass-through coefficient implied by the model. We
do so by evaluating elasticity of export price with respect to real exchange rate, evaluated at
the steady state values, to define the theoretical pass-through coefficient:
PT ≡ ∂ log(px)
∂ log(x)
=
θq
1−q
v∗(st)x(st)
v(st)
1 + θq
1−q
x(st)v∗(st)
v(st)
|ss =
θq
1−q
1 + θq
1−q
.
By definition, this number tells us by how much in percentage terms the real export price
moves in response to a 1% change of the real exchange rate x.
As we can see, the theoretical pass-through in the model crucially depends on the level
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of producer markups. In particular, for markups equal to 30%, the PT coefficient generated
by the model is 24%, for the level of markups equal to 50%, it is 33%, and for the level of
markups as high as 100%, it is 50%.
The evidence on the degree of pass-through varies widely in the literature, but most
studies, while controlling for costs and other factors, estimate the empirical pass-through
coefficient to be in the interval17 35%-50%. Our calculation above suggests that the model
needs markups of at least 50%.
4.2 Costly Distribution
As we can see from (10), the formulas for prices for in the case of costly distribution friction
are similar to the ones implied by consumer search friction. However, there is one crucial
difference that we should point out. In the case of costly distribution, as opposed to consumer
search, only part of the markup is denominated in the local numeraire units, limiting pricing-
to-market for the same level of markups across the two models. This conclusion follows
immediately from an analogous derivation of the theoretical exchange rate pass-through to
export prices, which in this case is given by
PT ≡ ∂ log(px)
∂ log(x)
=
ξ
θ−1
x(st)v∗(st)
v(st)
1 + ξ
θ−1
x(st)v∗(st)
v(st)
|ss =
ξ
θ−1
1 + ξ
θ−1
,
and thus is determined by a term that is lower than the total producer markup given by18
θ
θ − 1 +
ξ
θ − 1 .
17Most estimates are centered around 60% for import prices, which would imply 40% to export prices
(=100%-60%). For example, Goldberg & Campa (2005) find pass-through to import prices in OECD to be
around 46%. Goldberg & Knetter (1997) report number closer to .6 for import prices and thus .4 for export
prices.
18In the original paper by Corsetti and Dedola (2005) the non-tradable sector is assumed less productive
than the tradable sector—requiring a lower setting of ζ. This assumption, however, does not resolve the issue.
In the quantitative model, the share of distribution cost in the final retail price is tightly disciplined by the
available estimates by Burstein, Neves & Rebelo (2003) and effectively it does not matter whether it comes
from a parameter or a productivity inflated price of the non-tradable input.
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4.3 Industry Aggregation
Formulas for prices depend here on the firm’s market shares—as it varies the perceived
demand elasticity by the monopolistic intermediate good producers. Specifically, the export
price of the home good is given by
px(s
t) ≡ x(st)P ∗d (st) =
ε∗d(s
t)
ε∗d(st)− 1
(1 + τ) v(st)
where
ε(st) =
[
1
ρ
(1− S∗d(st)) +
1
γ
S∗d(s
t)
]−1
S∗d(s
t) =
P ∗d (s
t)d∗(st)
nP ∗f (st)f ∗(st) + nXP
∗
d (s
t)d∗(st)
while the home price of the same good is given by
pd(s
t) ≡ Pd(st) = εd(s
t)
εd(st)− 1v(s
t)
where
ε(st) =
[
1
ρ
(1− Sd(st)) + 1
γ
Sd(s
t)
]−1
Sd(s
t) =
Pd(s
t)d(st)
nPd(st)d(st) + nXPf (st)f(st)
(τ stands for the iceberg cost of exporting).
As we can see from the above formulas, markups for each market depend on the elasticity
of demand, ε
∗
ε∗−1 in the export market and
ε
ε−1 in the domestic market. Any variation in
markups in the model will hence work through the variation in these elasticities. Formally
this will work through the term 1
ρ
(1− S∗d) + 1γS∗d , in the above expressions. One can see
immediately that the variation in markups will be amplified by a larger difference between
elasticities γ and ρ (for a given change in siD), and also by a larger variation in the market
share S∗d . Following AB, we can derive the elasticity of exporter’s markup with respect the
market share
d log(px
v
)
d log(S∗d)
=
S∗d
(
1
γ
− 1
ρ
)
1− 1
ρ
(1− S∗d)− 1γS∗d
.
30
From the above expression, we can see that the size of the firm matters—the elasticity of
markup with respect to market share is strictly increasing in S∗d . That is, having large firms in
the model makes their markups very elastic to changes in market share, giving more pricing-
to-market. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) quantitatively meet this requirement by matching
the size distribution of firms in the data. In our quantitative analysis, since all firms are
identical, we satisfy the large firm requirement by making an extreme assumption of one
exporting firm.
The model then works as follows. After a positive productivity shock in the domestic
country, the market shares of domestic firms at home and abroad go up, which decreases the
elasticity of demand in both markets and raises markups in both markets ( ε
ε−1 is a decreasing
function). Because initially there was aggregate home bias in consumption, consumption
of good d abroad goes up by more in percentage terms than consumption of good d at
home, which causes the elasticity of exports to go down by more than the elasticity in the
domestic market. As a result, export markups rise relative to domestic markups for good d.
Quantitatively, this increase is accompanied by a real exchange rate depreciation, and the
export markup increase is large enough to raise the export price, restoring consistency with
the data in terms of the correlation of the export price and the exchange rate. 19.
The pricing to market mechanism of this model connects the degree of pass-through of
exchange rates to export prices through movement of market shares. We next investigate the
quantitative implications of this feature of the model.
4.3.1 Quantitative Potential for PTM
As noted above, for pricing to market to arise in the model, it is critical that market shares
move when the real exchange rate changes. In this section we ask how large these market
share movements need to be for the model to be consistent with the estimates of the empirical
pass-through of exchange rates into export prices of at least 35%, and the overall business
cycle frequency volatility of the real exchange rate of 3.97% (US quarterly data, 1984-2009).
To answer this question, we assume that only market shares covary with the real exchange
rates—an assumption justified by the fact that other components of the prices are typically
19In our setup, as opposed to the original, does not have an explicit link between entry and size generated by
firm level heterogeneity and fixed cost of entry. This could potentially generate additional effects. However,
the quantitative experiments presented in AB08 suggest that this is not a critical feature for any of the results
(see AB’s sensitivity analysis, Table 5, case F=0).
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controlled for in the empirical estimates of exchange rate pass-through. We next derive the
theoretical pass-through coefficient implied by the model (at the steady state),
PT ≡ d log px
d log x
=
S∗d
(
1
γ
− 1
ρ
)
1− 1
ρ
(1− S∗d)− 1γS∗d
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ss
d log Sˆ∗d
d log x
,
and by plugging in the required value of pass-through (PT = 0.35), we obtain the lowest
bound for the elasticity of market shares with respect to exchange rates
d log Sˆ∗d
d log x
≥ 0.35× 1−
1
ρ
(1− S∗d)− 1γS∗d
S∗d
(
1
γ
− 1
ρ
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ss
.
The right-hand side of the above formula tells us how much the foreign market shares
must move (in percentage terms) in response to a 1% change of the real exchange rate change
to deliver exchange rate pass-through of 35% to export prices.
The derived lowest bound depends only on elasticity parameters and steady state market
shares. Hence, we can evaluate it using the values of calibrated parameters and the targeted
aggregate import shares. Since higher S∗d helps the model to generate more PTM, in order
to give it the best chance, we follow our parameterization by assuming nX = 1—implying
that the market share of an average exporting firm is equal to an aggregate import share of
a country. Furthermore, we choose sectoral import share S∗d of 16.5% based on the numbers
reported by Atkeson and Burstein (2008)20. Note that this choice is favorable for the model,
as AB have 5 foreign firms in their model, and the average share of a firm is thus overstated
by our assumption that there is only one. The elasticity parameters are also taken from AB21.
Given the aforementioned values of all the parameters, our evaluation implies that the
market shares in the model must be at least 1.8 more volatile than the real exchange rate.
As mentioned above, we think that this is the most favorable calculation to the model, as the
same estimate using our baseline parameter values is as high as 4.4 (S∗d = .12, ρ = 8.7, γ =
1.52). Comparing to the data, 1.8 is still a bit too high. In the US data, the relative volatility
20Average of exports and imports of manufacturing goods in the US divided by gross manufacturing output
21In AB, these elasticities have been chosen to align the quantitative model with the producer markups
of 30% and an equal expenditure share across industries. In our specification, we target the same level of
markups and predicted theoretical pass-through of 40%.
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of the (aggregate) import share relative to the real exchange rate is about 1.2022.
Our final conclusion is that this friction can deliver high levels of exchange rate pass-
through to export prices for a reasonable range of producer markups, but on the business
cycle frequency, this implication is subject to the caveat of volatile market shares. (This
caveat is unlikely to be a problem on lower frequencies, which we do not study here.)
4.4 Deep Habits
The formulas for prices in the deep habits model crucially depend on the target market specific
invisible shadow value of habit. Specifically, the real export price is given by
px(s
t) = v(st) + ∆∗d(s
t)− (1− ρ)ψ∗d(st),
whereas the home price of the same good is given by
pd
(
st
)
= v(st) + ∆d(s
t)− (1− ρ)ψd(st),
where
∆d(s
t) =
pd(s
t)
φ
, (14)
∆∗d(s
t) =
x(st)p∗d(s
t)
φ
, (15)
and
ψd
(
st
)
=
∑
st+1
Q
(
st+1, s
t
)
µ
(
st+1|st) [ρψd (st+1)+ ∆d (st+1) θ (1− ϕ) dc (j, st+1)
hd (j, st)
]
, (16)
ψ∗d
(
st
)
=
∑
st+1
Q
(
st+1, s
t
)
µ
(
st+1|st) [ρψ∗d (st+1)+ ∆∗d (st+1) θ (1− ϕ) dc∗ (j, st+1)h∗d (i, st)
]
. (17)
In the above expressions, ∆ represents the shadow cost of selling an additional unit of
22To calculate this number we have rescaled nominal series for GDP by a constant equal to the share of
non-service sectors in GDP (for year 2000). Then, we have subtracted exports of goods to obtain the domestic
absorption as measure of domestic sectoral output. For imports we have used series for imports of goods to
the US. The time period is 1984:2009. Volatility of the real exchange rate for this period is 3.97% (IMF IFS),
and it has been used to relate it.
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output today, and it is implied by the loss of markups on existing sales due to an underlying
fall in the price. ψ represents the shadow value of habit, and due to the persistence of habit,
and is given by a recursive asset pricing equation involving an exogenous depreciation of habit
determined by 1 − ρ, and a per unit ‘dividend payment’ equal to the reduced future cost of
sales by an additional unit of habit23.
The above formulas for prices reveal that pricing to market crucially depends on the
dynamics of the shadow value of habit. In fact, after substituting ∆ into the expressions
above, we can see that in the absence of ψ, the export price is proportional to the marginal
cost as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model:
x(st)pd
(
st
)
=
φ
φ− 1
[
v(st)− (1− ρ)ψ∗d
]
.
What then determines the value of habit? Qualitatively, many factors, including discount
factor and future evolution of prices, but, quantitatively, the following effect seems most
important in driving the response of prices to a positive productivity shock. When marginal
cost v falls persistently in the model due to a positive shock, the home producers know today
that due to persistently lower cost and prices (even if markups were constant) they will be
likely selling more today and in the future. As a result, due to the higher expected future sales
by them, habit today becomes more valuable (term θ (1− ϕ) dc (j, st+1) /hd (j, st) goes up) as
it optimizes on the expensed cost of raising sales ∆. Consequently, they slash markups below
the Dixit-Stiglitz benchmark and price to market. (It is fairly straightforward to illustrate
how the described above effects arise from the above formulas for prices by considering a one
time permanent productivity shock.)
4.4.1 Quantitative Potential for PTM
With productivity shocks, the model generates a negative pass-through of exchange rates to
export prices. More precisely, in the aftermath of a persistent positive productivity shock in
the home country, home firms expect in this model to sell more abroad in the future, which
makes habit abroad more valuable today, and thus results in lower markups on exported
goods. Moveover, the markups abroad fall more than markups at home, as under home-bias,
in this class of models the increase in demand abroad is also larger than the increase at home
23Note that the expression θ (1− ϕ) dc (j, st+1) /hd (j, t) that appears in the formula for ψ is equal to the
derivative of the demand function faced by the monopolist w.r.t. hd.
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(in percentage terms). The same conclusion applies to standard demand shocks multiplying
the utility function of a representative consumer—the exception is a particular specification
of demand shocks proposed by Ravn et al. (2007)24.
Based on this analysis, we thus conclude that the model requires a particular correlation
between real exchange rate movements and the value of habit. This property will not in
general hold for all kind of shocks/model environments25.
5 Parameterization
All models are parameterized in a uniform way (whenever possible). The common targets we
use to parameterize all models are:
• Imports/GDP ratio of 12% (US data)
• 30% producer markups
• 30% work hours relative to time endowment
• Short-run elasticity of trade flows of 0.7 (except for the industry aggregation friction; see
Appendix for details)
The parameters, such as β, σ, δ, α, are calibrated in a way standard to the literature.
Productivity shock process is common across all models, and symmetric across countries.
The persistence parameter is .91, volatility of measured TFP residuals is 0.00608, and the
correlation between measured TFP residuals is .28. In the case of Corsetti & Dedola (2005)
the process has been taken directly from Corsetti, Dedola & Leduc (2008). (See the Appendix
for more details.)
We now turn to the description of the specifics of the calibration of each friction. The
values of all parameters are summarized in Table 1.
Consumer Search We parameterize this friction by requiring that the following additional
targets from the original paper are met:
24In the setup proposed by Ravn et al. (2007) additive demand shocks generate incomplete pass-through
because they are critically combined with an additional habit formation imposed on the government consump-
tion generating demand shocks. As a result, government expenditures creates an externality on lower markups
in the entire economy. This effect flips the correlation of the real exchange rate with the shock—which in
this case depreciates following a positive demand shock at home rather than appreciates.
25We do not report here the results from the additive formulation of the deep habits model, but we have
studied this variation as well, and the same conclusions apply.
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Table 1: Parameter Values in the Models.
Parameter Baseline Variation (model w/ asterisk)
Common parameters
σ 2.0
β 0.99
α 0.36
δ 0.025
Consumer Search, Consumer
Search∗
η 0.325 n.a.
ω 0.643 0.7562
θ 1.73 11.193
z¯ n.a. 5.46
γ 2.0 1.76
q 0.148 0.1051
φ n.a. 8.5
κ n.a. 0.033
Deep Habits
θ -0.1
ρ 0.85
γ 0.675
l¯ 10
ϕ 3.48
Costly Distribution, Costly
Distribution∗
ω 0.6680 n.a.
θ 8.7 8.0
ξ 1.33 0.8
γ 1.63 1
δ as above .1 (annualized)
β as above .96 (annualized)
z¯N (rel. prod. of NT-sector) n.a. 0.5
Industry Aggregation
nD 4
nX 1
ρ 8.7
γ 1.52
τ 0.1525
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• shopping to time spent working of 25% as reported by Alessandria (2009)
• coefficient of variation of the posted prices of 25%
Because our baseline specification of the friction differs from the original, we no longer
target the share of search in time endowment of households as Alessandria does. An analog
of this share in our model is the fraction of GDP that is trapped into the distribution sector.
In our setup, it is endogenously implied by the model, and accounts for 60% of the total
value added produced in the economy. Relative to the size of retail and distribution sectors
(38% of total value added in non-service sector in the US data for year 2000), this is still
a bit too large. However, business-to-business search frictions may not be confined to these
sectors only—as producers in the data also search to purchase intermediate goods.
Consumer Search* The parameterization of this setup follows closely the original paper.
All targets of the original paper are met, but the exact values of the parameters are slightly
different because the value of the common parameters is different.
Costly Distribution We parameterize the friction by requiring that distribution costs
constitute 50% share of ‘non-tradable’ inputs in retail prices (as implied by Burstein, Neves
& Rebelo (2003)).
Costly Distribution* The model has been parameterized similarly to the original one.
The baseline period is one year, and all parameters have been adjusted to this frequency.
The stochastic process has been taken from Corsetti, Dedola & Leduc (2008). All targets of
the original paper are met and all main parameters take the same value. However, unlike the
original model, this version of the model does not include monetary shocks and sticky wages.
Industry Aggregation The most important parameters for pricing-to-market are: the
number of firms chosen in the model, and the difference between the elasticities, γ and ρ. In
terms of the number of firms, as pointed out by Atkeson and Burstein, the presence of large
firms is crucial to generating pricing to market. In the original paper, there is a large number
firms (40), but firm size heterogeneity implies that only a few large ones really matter for
aggregate prices. In our specification of their friction, due to assumed representativeness, all
firms need to be of equal size. Therefore, we set the total numbers of firms to a low number
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of n = 4, and have nX = 1 firm that exports to be consistent with the ratio (
nX
n
) taken from
AB.26
To calibrate the value of elasticity parameters γ and ρ, we note that the difference between
these elasticities maps onto the degree of pass-through generated by the model, and their
weighted average determines the average level of producer markups. Consequently, we choose
these numbers to match a coefficient of pass-through of exchange rates to export prices of
40% and producer markups of 30% (as in the original paper).
Deep Habits As for the habit parameters, θ and ρ, we chose them in consistency with
Ravn et al. (2006).
6 Quantitative Analysis
6.1 Data
To compare prices in the models to the data, we focus here exclusively on the moments
characterizing the dynamics of export prices. Our moments are motivated by the following
decomposition of the export price movements:
px ≡ PX
P
=
PX
PD︸︷︷︸
pxd
× PD
P︸︷︷︸
pd
, (18)
where PX denotes the home currency based price of exported good (basket), PD denotes a
home currency based producer price of a comparable tradable good (basket) sold at home,
and P is some measure of the overall price of aggregate consumption in the home country
(we chose CPI for convenience).
This decomposition allows us to break down the movements of the export prices into the
pure deviations from LOP pxd, and the residual relative price movements observed in the home
market pd. In most models, PX and PD will correspond to the price of the same commodity,
and so pxd will be a good test of the model’s capability to generate deviations from LOP. As
we will see below, in the data pxd is highly volatile and highly positively correlated with the
real exchange rate. Standard models will imply that this term is constant, and all our friction
will move it in some way.
26It would be possible to incorporate several different firm sizes, but we do not think it would matter much
for the result. We have not validated this claim.
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Table 2: Moments summarizing deviations from LOP.
Statistic Description
σ(pxd)/σ(x) Relative magnitude of deviations from LOP
σ(pd)/σ(x) Relative volatility of the price of tradable goods
at home
ρ(pxd, x) Correlation of dev. from LOP w/ the real ex-
change rate
ρ(pd, x) Correlation of home prices w/ the real exchange
rate
σ denotes the standard deviation of logged and HP filtered data; ρ denotes the correlation coefficient.
The particular moments of the data we will focus are listed in the table below.
6.1.1 Aggregate Evidence
To document the moments described above for the aggregate data, we use US data on pro-
ducer export price index (EPI) from BEA to measure export prices, and a comparable index
for producer prices of finished products excluding food and energy (PPI) to measure home
prices of comparable tradable basket.27 We have excluded food and energy because these
components are likely to be volatile for reasons unrelated to business cycle fluctuations. To
measure the price of aggregate consumption, we use CPI that excludes food and energy for
consistency (the results the not depend on this). All our data is quarterly for the time pe-
riod (1983-2010), and statistics are based on first logged and then HP filtered time series
(smoothing 1600).
The table 3 summarizes all the results, which are additionally illustrated graphically in
Figure 1. As we can see, Panel A of table 3 shows that aggregate real export price in the
US is relatively volatile and highly positively correlated with the real exchange rate. On the
basis of our decomposition, and the statistics included in panel B of the same table, we can
conclude that most of the movements of the real export price movements are attributable to
the deviations from LOP. In fact, the deviations from LOP captured by the relative
price pxd are at least 4 times more volatile than the residual pd, and are almost
the sole driver of the observed positive correlation between the aggregate real
27The PPI data confounds both export prices and domestic prices, and is only an approximate measure
of PD. However, for our particular application this is sufficient, as it will only imply that our conclusions
establish the lower bound for the underlying deviations from LOP implied by the aggregate data.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of Aggregate Export Price in the US.
export price and the real exchange rate.
The above results are broadly consistent with the idea of a positive but incomplete pass-
through of exchange rates to export prices.
6.1.2 Supporting Micro Evidence
To support our aggregate findings, here we offer an alternative look at the disaggregated data
at a commodity level. The data-set we use comes from Bank of Japan and includes prices of
30 most heavily traded manufacturing commodities disaggregated at roughly 4 digit level28.
The prices come from a producer level survey of the actual contractual agreements. The time
period is 1995-2005.
The table 4 reports the results. As we can see, the patterns we see on the individual
commodity level are consistent with the aggregate evidence listed in the previous
table. Real export prices within the majority of commodity classifications turn out volatile
and highly positively correlated with the Japanese real exchange rate. Moreover, just like in
28The examples of included commodity categories are: computers, ball bearing, agricultural tractors, silicon
wafers etc...
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Table 3: Deviations from LOP in Aggregate Data.
Statistic Value
A. Properties of Aggregate Real Export Price
σ(px)/σ(x) .52
ρ(px, x) .47
B. Deviations from LOP
σ(pxd)/σ(x) .53
ρ(pxd, x) .51
C. Residual
σ(pd)/σ(x) .13
ρ(pd, x) -.18
σ denotes the standard deviation of logged and HP filtered data, ρ denotes the correlation coefficient.
Table 4: Deviations from LOP in Disaggregated Data.
Statistics Median Value Quartile bracket
[Q1, Q3]
A. Properties of disaggregated real export prices
σ(px,i)/σ(x) .88 [ .54, .99 ]
ρ(px,i, x) .82 [ .50, .89 ]
B. Deviations from LOP
σ(pxd,i)/σ(x) .90 [ .55, .99 ]
ρ(pxd,i, x) .84 [ .67, .89 ]
C. Residual
σ(pd,i)/σ(x) .23 [ .11, .33 ]
ρ(pd,i, x) -.14 [-.25, .07 ]
σ denotes the standard deviation of logged and HP filtered data, ρ denotes the correlation coefficient.
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the case of aggregate data, the decomposition into a set of component statistics reveals that
the movements of export prices are attributable to deviations from the law of one price. The
relative price prx,i is highly volatile and positively correlated with the Japanese real (effective)
exchange rate, whereas the home price of the same commodity classification is much less
volatile and actually slightly negatively correlated with the real exchange rate.
We now turn to analyze the predictions of the theory.
6.2 Predictions of the Theory
Quantitative results are reported in Tables 5 and 6. As we can see from Table 5 (Row 4
of Panel B), all models generate some degree of pricing-to-market. Compared to US data,
most statistics look well qualitatively, but the models typically fall short in generating enough
incompleteness of pass-through (as pointed out in the sections above). Also, as pointed out
in previous sections, the Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2006) model generates pricing to
market that gives rise to counterfactual correlations of the aggregate price indices (Panel A
of Table 5).
Below, we briefly discuss each friction’s quantitative predictions, and highlight the main
predictions of each model.
Consumer Search The baseline model generates more pricing to market as compared to
costly distribution friction. As discussed above, this is a robust feature of this friction and
comes from the fact that in the case of consumer search the entire markup is denominated
in the foreign unit, as opposed to only part of it in the case of costly distribution.
Interestingly, despite a low degree of theoretical pass-through predicted by the model, it
implies large deviations from LOP as measured by pxd. At the same time, the real export
price px is not volatile as measured relative to the real exchange rate. The reason for this
behavior of prices is a relatively volatile home marginal cost v that is also strongly negatively
correlated with the (counterfactually not too volatile) real exchange rate. Given the low
overall volatility of x, this effect significantly boosts the volatility of cost-based real exchange
rate affecting pxd relative to CPI-based real exchange rate affecting px. As we can see from
column 4 of Table 5, this is not the case in for consumer search*. This version of the model
introduces an additional shock, and by matching volatility of the real exchange rate, aligns
closely cost-based real exchange rate with the CPI-based real exchange rate.
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The baseline model does exceptionally well in accounting for the quantity-related statis-
tics. However, part this success is can be attributed to our particular specification of the
friction that effectively makes a large share of GDP to be a non-tradable distribution/search
sector. In our baseline specification more than half of the GDP is accounted for by the value
added generated in the final good sector (search). Such large share would help all models to
come closer to the data.
In contrast, the consumer search* model, by treating shopping as home production and by
adding an extra shock, is no longer neutral to quantities. The model results in excess output
volatility and excess employment volatility. Moreover, we have also studied a specification of
consumer search friction featuring consumer search with a CRRA utility function and only
productivity shocks (no labor wedge shock), which we do not report here. This specification
performed strictly worse than the frictionless model due to a negative international comove-
ment of employment and counterfactually low international comovement of output. Our final
conclusion is that the consumer search specification is not fully neutral to business cycle
dynamics of quantities.
Costly Distribution, and Costly Distribution* The model results are similar to con-
sumer search model, but due to a slightly different dependence of export prices on markups,
the performance of the costly distribution model for prices is strictly worse.
Industry Aggregation While the model does well on prices by generating a high degree of
exchange rate pass-through to export prices, quantity statistics look worse when compared to
the standard model. This is not surprising due to a high setting of elasticity between home and
foreign goods that is needed for pricing to market to arise. Specifically, the model implies
a too low international comovement of GDP relative to TFP, and an excess international
comovement of consumption. In addition, despite capital accumulation being present, it
implies a positive correlation of net exports and output, versus a negative one in the data
and in the standard model.
Finally, we also note that since pricing to market arises due to market share movements,
once the model is required to match real exchange rate volatility from the data, it may be
harder than in the case of other models to tame quantities by introducing additional features.
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Deep Habits The prices look worse than in the standard model. Statistics for quantities
look similar to the standard model, and in some dimensions even better.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide the first unified study of several leading pricing to market frictions.
We offer several conclusions as a guidance for future applied research on the topic. The key
take away from our study is that the applicability of each particular friction crucially depends
on the specifics of the particular application at hand.
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Appendix
A1. National Accounts in the Model
Real GDP is real GDP in constant prices (≡steady state prices). Since the price of consump-
tion/investment good is normalized to one, consumption and investment in period zero prices are c
and i. Employment index is measured by li,t.
In deflation of the prices and measurement of real exchange rate, we have used the ideal CPI.
This does not make any difference except for consumer search friction. In the case of this model, the
transacted prices differ from the posted price (CPI measurement should be based on posted prices).
However, since in the data such distinction does not make any difference for any of the patterns
we focus on29 we have decided to use the ideal CPI to abstract from any implications of the model
coming from this channel.
A2. Estimation of the Productivity Shock Process
To construct the TFP residuals z from the data we follow a similar procedure to Heathcote & Perri
(2004), and include physical capital. Physical capital has been constructed from the gross-fixed
capital formation series using perpetual inventory method with exogenously assumed depreciation
rate of δ = 0.025. For the US we have used total hours worked, and for the rest of the world civil
employment index instead. Given the quarterly data-set from 1980.1 to 2004.3 for the aggregate of
main 15 European countries, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, and Australia, we have constructed the
series of z from the following equation
log(z) = log(y)− 0.36 log(k)− 0.64 log(n),
where y denotes GDP in constant prices, and the coefficient 0.64 denotes the assumed share of labor
income in GDP - consistent with the parameterization of the model and the values estimated for the
developed countries. We linearly detrend the series for log(z), and estimate the parameters of the
underlying productivity process. In the case of Corsetti & Dedola (2005) the process has been taken
directly from Corsetti, Dedola & Leduc (2008)—which limits our analysis to annual frequency.
A1. Measurement of Short-run Price Elasticity of Trade
Short-run elasticity of trade flows measures how trade flows between countries respond to a relative
price changes seen in the time-series. Here, we use the so called volatility ratio to assess the lower
bound for this elasticity.
When the demand for domestic and foreign good is modeled by a CES aggregator of the form
G(dt, ft) =
(
ωtd
γ−1
γ
t + (1− ωt)f
γ−1
γ
t
) γγ−1
,
the import ratio ftdt is intimately related to the relative price of domestic and imported goods
pd,t
pf,t
:
log
ft
dt
= γ log
pd,t
pf,t
+ log
ωt
1− ωt . (A1)
29I.e exactly analogous patterns can be documented by instead using PCE deflator or GDP deflator,
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Thus, in the case of time-varying weights ω, the above approach gives the upper bound value for
the value of this parameter:
γ = σ(log
ft
dt
)/σ(log
pd,t
pf,t
+
1
γ
log
ωt
1− ωt ) ≤ σ(log
ft
dt
)/σ(log
pd,t
pf,t
) = V R. (A2)
Based on the median value for OECD countries, we this way obtain the upper bound on elasticity
γ to be .7 on quarterly frequency. In models with frictions, VR does not map onto γ, and so we
instead construct the analogous object in the model, and set γ so that the model implied VR is .7.
A1. Data Sources
Export prices and PPI data comes from BEA. Real exchange rate data comes from International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Database, 2010. Prices for Japan come from Bank
of Japan and have been compiled by the authors from flat files available online. To construct TFP
residuals used in the estimation of the stochastic process, we have used nominal GDP data from
World Development Indicators, World Bank, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, GDP in constant prices
and Civil Employment from Source OECD.org, Quarterly National Accounts, series for physical
capital have been constructed using the perpetual inventory method with a constant depreciation
of 2.5%, and aggregate GDP for blocks of countries has been computed from growth rates of GDP
in constant prices (recent years, varies by country) weighted by the nominal GDP of each country
in 2000 (we applied the growth rates backwards). Statistics pertaining to quantities that appear in
the paper have been calculated from the same data.
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